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Future thinking is defined as the ability to withdraw from reality and mentally project oneself 
into the future. The primary aim of the present study was to examine whether functions of 
future thoughts differed depending on their mode of elicitation (spontaneous or voluntary) and 
an attribute of goal-relatedness (selected-goal-related or selected-goal-unrelated). After 
producing spontaneous and voluntary future thoughts in a laboratory paradigm, participants 
provided ratings on four proposed functions of future thinking (self, directive, social and 
emotional regulation). Findings showed that spontaneous and voluntary future thoughts were 
rated similarly on all functions except the directive function, which was particularly relevant 
to spontaneous future thoughts. Future thoughts classed as goal-related (selected-goal-related) 
were rated higher across all functions, and there was largely no interaction between mode of 
elicitation and goal-relatedness. A higher proportion of spontaneous future thoughts were 
selected-goal-related compared with voluntary future thoughts. In general, these results 
indicate that future thinking has significant roles across affective, behavioural, self and social 
functions, and supports theoretical views that implicate spontaneous future thought in goal-
directed cognition and behaviour. 
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Functions of spontaneous and voluntary future thinking: Evidence from subjective 
ratings 
 1. Introduction  
Future thinking refers to the ability to withdraw from reality and mentally project 
oneself into the future (Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Szpunar, 2010). For example, while driving 
a car, one’s mind may jump forward to an enjoyable meal at a restaurant while on holiday in 
the summer. Future thinking can arise in consciousness via two routes or modes; one 
voluntary and one spontaneous (Cole & Kvavilashvili, 2019b; Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008). 
When intentionally initiated, cognitive control mechanisms are employed at the construction 
stage to consciously select and simulate details of a future event, resulting in what has been 
termed voluntary future thinking (Cole & Kvavilashvili, 2019a). In contrast, spontaneous 
future thinking is defined as “unintended thought, related to the future, that comes to mind 
with little effort and little control over its content” (p. 635, Cole & Kvavilashvili, 2009a). 
Such future thoughts spontaneously ‘pop up’ without intent (Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; 
Cole, Staugaard & Berntsen, 2016)1. Reflecting this distinction, notions of dual processes 
(i.e., ‘generative’ versus ‘direct’) of future thinking have been adopted by several authors 
(Anderson, Dewhurst & Nash, 2012; Cole et al., 2016; Jeunehomme & D’Argembeau, 2016; 
see Cole and Kvavilashvili, 2019b for a theoretical proposal concerning a dual process 
account). It should be noted that, although distinct, spontaneous future thoughts share some 
common features with other spontaneous cognitive phenomena, such as mind wandering2. 
 
1 For an in-depth discussion of conceptual differences between spontaneous and voluntary future thought, see 
Cole & Kvavilashvili, (2019b). 
2 There are several phenomena that are related to spontaneous future thinking. For example, mind wandering is 
described as a shift in one’s attention away from events in the environment and towards mental content 
generated by the individual, and is often, but not necessarily, about the future (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). 
Daydreaming is related to both mind wandering and spontaneous future thinking but generally involves 
withdrawing from the surrounding environment and moving one’s thoughts onto absent or imaginary 
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Future thinking is proposed to have important functions for our everyday lives 
including planning, emotion regulation and instantiating a temporally extended and coherent 
identity (D’Argembeau, Renaud & Van der Linden, 2011; Boyer, 2008; Finnbogadóttir & 
Berntsen, 2011; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). Although theoretical formulations have 
proposed specific functions of future thinking (e.g. Baumeister, Vohs & Oettingen, 2016;  
Bulley, Henry & Suddendorf, 2016; Conway, Loveday & Cole, 2016; Schacter, Benoit, & 
Szpunar, 2017, Schacter, 2012), a precise understanding of how functions map on to 
voluntary and spontaneous future thinking has yet to emerge. This may be because, to date, 
there exists a limited amount of studies systematically assessing different functions of future 
events, and how they depend on phenomenological qualities (e.g., more or less abstract) or 
emotional valence (e.g., D’Argembeau et al., 2011; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013). To our 
knowledge, the present study represents the first in which the functions of spontaneous and 
voluntary future thinking are systematically examined and compared using an established 
laboratory technique (Barzykowski, Radel, Niedźwieńska, & Kvavilashvili, 2019; Cole et al., 
2016; Plimpton, Patel & Kvavilashvili, 2015).  
Future thinking, in general, relies on episodic content, but is underpinned by semantic 
knowledge: One must have an understanding of what the world will be like in the future to 
integrate sensory-perceptual specific content (semantic scaffolding hypothesis; see Irish & 
Piguet, 2013). Although there are different forms of future thinking (e.g., simulation, 
prediction, intention and planning, Szpunar, Spreng, & Schacter, 2014), the present study 
will focus on simulations – defined as a ‘detailed mental representation of a specific 
 
events/objects. Importantly, daydreaming and mind wandering can involve volitional processes (Dorsch, 2015; 
Seli et al., 2016), whereas a cardinal property of spontaneous future thought is its unbidden nature (see Cole & 
Kvavilashvili, 2019a).  
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autobiographical future event’ (Szpunar, Spreng & Schacter, 2014, p. 18416). This 
conceptualisation is consistent with most of the primary research on future thinking (see  
Schacter et al., 2017). This conceptual clarity will make predictions and explanations clearer, 
because (1) it does not conflate types of future thinking and (2) we base our predictions on 
the most studied and well-understood variant. 
 1.1.  Spontaneity and Goals in Relation to Future Thought 
In the following we will discuss spontaneous and voluntary processes in future 
thought as well as briefly addressing the relationship between episodic future thoughts and 
goals. Previous research has demonstrated the existence of shared characteristics of 
spontaneous and voluntary event simulations. For example, future events tend to be 
emotionally positive and draw upon the same autobiographical knowledge, regardless of how 
they are elicited (see Berntsen, 2009; Cole et al., 2016). However, spontaneous and voluntary 
future thinking differ on several characteristics. For instance, spontaneously elicited thoughts 
have been found to be more specific, less vivid, and are elicited faster than voluntarily 
elicited thoughts (see Cole et al., 2016).  
Researchers have typically used different methodologies to examine voluntary and 
spontaneous future thinking: Voluntary future thoughts are typically generated in laboratory 
settings by asking participants to consciously imagine an event in their personal future (e.g., 
Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2008; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013). On the other hand, studies 
have utilised a more naturalistic structured diary method to investigate spontaneous future 
thoughts (e.g., Berntsen, 1996; Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; 
Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004). Using a diary method means spontaneous future thoughts 
cannot always be recorded in ‘real time’; therefore, relying on retrospection. This becomes a 
methodological issue as such thoughts are easily forgotten, which may lead to retrospective 
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guessing (see Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). Nevertheless, diary studies have made 
important discoveries: For example, that spontaneous thoughts occur mainly when an 
individual is participating in routine tasks that require little attention (Berntsen & Jacobsen, 
2008; Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004) and are elicited by identifiable cues either from the 
external environment or from internal triggers (Berntsen, 1998; Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008).  
Recently, a task was designed in the field of autobiographical memory (Schlagman & 
Kvavilashvili, 2008) and adapted to future thinking research (Cole et al., 2016; Plimpton et 
al., 2015) which enabled researchers to assess spontaneous and voluntary future thoughts 
under similar conditions in the laboratory. In this paradigm, conditions in which spontaneous 
thoughts naturally occur are simulated in controlled conditions: Participants are presented 
with a vigilance task, whereby it is emphasised to participants that they must identify 
infrequent visual stimuli (vertical line arrays). As a ‘secondary task’ (which is actually the 
main outcome measure) participants are also asked to pay attention to their thoughts, and 
report any thought which may be spontaneous and future-oriented. Word phrases are 
embedded within the vigilance task which are intended to act as verbal cues to trigger 
spontaneous future thoughts. External reliability of the laboratory paradigm has been 
established by the demonstration of common findings across laboratory and diary studies 
(Bernsten & Jacobsen, 2008; Cole et al., 2016; Finnbogadóttir & Berntsen, 2013). For 
example, spontaneous thoughts - assessed in everyday life and the laboratory - are more 
specific and have a greater emotional impact than voluntary thoughts (e.g., Cole et al., 2016; 
Berntsen & Hall, 2004). The present study utilised this laboratory paradigm to examine 
voluntary and spontaneous future thinking. 
Of course, as well as imagining possible futures, individuals can, and do, mentally 
project themselves into the past (Conway, 2005). Indeed, some researchers have synthesised 
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past and future thinking into one capacity - mental time travel (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 
1997). However, in designing a study of functions of voluntary and spontaneous future 
thought, it would be unwise to simply assume that specific functions of past mental time 
travel (e.g., Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005; Harris, Rasmussen, & Berntsen, 2014) 
apply to future thinking. For this reason, the current paper identifies those functions that 
conceptually and logically map on to future thinking, and used these in constructing the 
questionnaire used to assess functions in this study. 
Finally, previous research has investigated the relationship between future thinking 
and goals by utilising the concept of current concerns (Klinger, 1975). Current concerns refer 
to higher-order goals (e.g., losing weight) rather than drives (e.g., hunger) or specific ‘action 
plans’ (Cole & Berntsen, 2016). Current concerns can influence the content of one’s thoughts 
and dreams (e.g., Klinger, Barta, & Maxeiner, 1980; Nikles, Charles, Brecht, Klinger, & 
Bursell, 1998) from goal commitment until goal completion or abandonment (see Klinger, 
1975). Studies have found that selected-goal-related future thoughts have different 
characteristics than selected-goal-unrelated future thoughts (Cole & Berntsen, 2016; 
D'Argembeau et al., 2010; D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011). For example, selected-goal-
related future thoughts have been found to be more rehearsed, vivid, emotionally intense and 
positive, and more frequently have an impact on current mood (Cole & Berntsen, 2016). 
Consistent with Cole & Berntsen (2016), the present paper adopts a technique whereby 
participants list their most salient current concerns and then self-code whether each future 
thought is related to these (hence the term selected-goal-related), or not, thereby creating a 
way to compare qualities of future thoughts that are, and are not, particularly goal-relevant.  
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 1.2.  Functions of Future Thinking 
We now briefly summarise possible functions of future thinking in relation to mode 
of elicitation and goals. From a limited search of the literature, four broad categories of 
functions were identified that may apply to future thought: Directive (guide thinking and 
behaviour), self (self-continuity and identity formation), social (social bonding and social 
identity), and emotional regulation (prepare and reassure) (e.g., Barsics, Van der Linden, & 
D'Argembeau, 2016; D’Argembeau, Renaud & Van der Linden, 2011). 
The directive function is suggested to derive from evolutionarily early adaptations 
(enhancing ‘biological fitness’, see Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007) and assumes that future 
thoughts also guide planning, problem-solving and self-regulation of behaviour in 
contemporary life (Schacter, 2012; Schacter et al., 2017, for relevant reviews; see Pillemer, 
2003 for a review of directive functions of autobiographical memories). An example of the 
planning function is highlighted by temporal discounting - the tendency to prefer smaller 
rewards that are temporally close over larger temporally distant ones (Benoit, Gilbert, & 
Burgess, 2011): Studies have shown that future thinking attenuates this effect, ensuring 
individuals make more rational and healthy choices (Daniel, Stanton & Epstein, 2013; Peters 
& Büchel, 2010). 
If spontaneous future thought could spontaneously trigger plans based on our ongoing 
behaviour (circumventing or reducing the requirement of cognitive control), its role in human 
planning could be more prominent and efficient than voluntary future thought (see Berntsen 
2009 for similar arguments). Indeed, a naturalistic study of daily thoughts indicated that 
future thoughts are categorised mostly as having a planning function (D’Argembeau, Renaud 
& Van der Linden, 2011). Although spontaneity was measured by D’Argembeau and 
colleagues (2011), the directive function of future thoughts were not subdivided based on 
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whether they were truly spontaneous, leaving open the relevance to spontaneous future 
thoughts.  
A recent study did establish that spontaneous future thoughts reach consciousness 
before those that employ wilful control processes (Cole et al., 2016), which could be useful 
in situations that call for immediate action such as escaping negative or risky life events 
(Pillemer, 2003). Also, spontaneous thought processes are assumed to underlie key aspects of 
human self-regulation, such as when making explicit if-then plans (implementation 
intentions, Gollwitzer, 1999) and retrieving explicitly generated memories of future tasks 
(prospective memory, McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). In line with these approaches, it is 
proposed here that, after a plan is generated voluntarily, spontaneous thought processes 
follow on to aid successful goal completion. In other words, spontaneous future thoughts are 
a well-suited form of mental representation to orient and reorient individuals to their future 
plans (see Cole & Kvavilashvili, 2019b). It is noteworthy that directive functions manifest 
themselves differently in remembering and imagining the future: In memory, this may 
involve negative events as opportunities to change future behaviour (e.g., Michael Jordan’s 
rejection of entry into a varsity team provided inspiration and motivation to succeed, 
Pillemer, 2003), whereas in future imagining, this may simply involve a positive scenario one 
wants to have happen (e.g., helping a team win first place in the basketball league). 
Interestingly, as discussed by Pillemer (2003), directive memories may occur spontaneously 
too. 
            Some argue that episodic future thinking has a key role in shaping one’s sense of self 
and identity (self-function, Conway, Loveday & Cole, 2016; D’Argembeau, Lardi & Van der 
Linden, 2012; Prebble, Addis & Tippett, 2013). It is known that wilfully-generated future 
thoughts are rated higher on the self-function than autobiographical memories (Rasmussen & 
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Berntsen, 2013) and that individuals can and do experience self-defining future projections 
(i.e., relevant to one’s identity) (D'Argembeau et al., 2012) which contribute to the formation 
of an adult identity during adolescence (Dunkel & Anthis, 2001). Markus and Nurius (1986) 
utilised the term possible selves to portray representations of future selves. Possible selves 
can be hoped-for and involve one’s future self being happy and satisfied (Dunkel & Anthis, 
2001). Possible selves can also be feared selves, involving concerns such as developing a 
critical illness (Fleury, Sedikides, & Donovan, 2002). Future thoughts of possible selves 
contribute to the formation and the exploration of an individual’s identity (Dunkel & Anthis, 
2001) and they have been found to motivate behaviour change (Ruvolo & Markus, 1992).  
         Herein, we propose that both voluntary and spontaneous future thoughts will have a 
broadly equivalent self-function. It is also predicted that goal-relevance will moderate this 
function such that selected-goal-related future thoughts will be rated higher on the self-
function than selected-goal-unrelated future thoughts. This is based on a study by Cole and 
Berntsen (2016) showing selected-goal-related future thinking was more associated with the 
self-function than selected-goal-unrelated future thinking. Similarly, a study of mind-
wandering found a greater number of spontaneous future-directed thoughts (than past) were 
produced following a self-reflection exercise (see Smallwood et al., 2011). 
  We may intuitively define future thoughts that have a social function as those which 
are shared with other individuals, perhaps to increase feelings of ‘closeness’ or community. 
In autobiographical memory research, memories are shared to demonstrate empathy or 
intimacy, ease communication, or facilitate social bonding (Bluck et al., 2005). Although this 
is an important component of the social relevance of prospection, one may also imagine 
future thoughts because they contribute to one’s social identity. Social identity can be defined 
as how we categorise ourselves in terms of social groups. Social identity can exert powerful 
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effects on feelings, attitudes and behaviour, and explains how in-group biases are ever-
present (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Do future thoughts link us closer with social bonds? One 
previous study found that voluntarily-generated future thoughts were rated lower than 
autobiographical memories on the social function (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013), suggesting 
this type of future thought has a comparatively weaker function in the social domain, at least 
compared with memories. The current study will make further steps in examining the social 
function of future thoughts. 
  Finally, considering emotion, emotionally positive future thoughts may provide 
insight in terms of the emotional regulation function. Several studies have established that, 
compared to past events, future events are more positive (termed the ‘future positivity bias’) 
when participants freely self-generate events (e.g., Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; Rasmussen & 
Berntsen, 2013). It has been proposed that the future positivity bias serves to optimistically 
motivate people toward their future (Berntsen & Bohn, 2010). Positive future thinking may 
also have an emotional regulation function as it reassures individuals about themselves and 
their potential future (see Barsics et al., 2016). This finding also illustrates how one future 
thought may serve several functions (see Methods). 
      Further evidence for an emotional regulation function has been found in research that 
manipulated participant’s future thinking. When participants were instructed to imagine a 
particular future thought (e.g., how to prepare for an exam) they were more likely to engage 
in coping strategies (e.g., increased study) which was found to decrease the negative 
emotions they felt towards the event (Pham & Taylor, 1999). Future thinking may assist in 
emotional regulation because it allows individuals to anticipate their emotional states for 
future scenarios and develop some perceived control over them (see Armitage & Reidy, 
2012; Pham & Taylor, 1999). In the present study, it was assumed that future thoughts with 
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an emotional regulation function allow individuals to experience their emotions with a future 
focus and develop control over them before/if a particular scenario occurs. Therefore, the 
participants will feel more prepared/reassured because they feel in control of their emotions. 
The present study will examine present-orientated emotional regulation (i.e., to reassure 
oneself), and future-orientated emotional regulation (i.e., to prepare oneself) as subtypes of 
emotional regulation, consistent with Barsics et al (2016). 
 1.3. Research Aims and Hypotheses of the Current Study 
      It is clear that some indirect and direct evidence exists concerning the possible functions 
of future thinking. However due to the relative paucity of research in the domain of 
spontaneous future thought (Cole & Kvavilashvili, 2019a), it is an open question whether and 
how voluntary and spontaneous future thoughts differ from voluntary future thoughts in 
terms of their perceived function/s.  
By using a tailored laboratory paradigm (Cole, Staugaard & Berntsen, 2016) the 
present study allowed us to examine perceived functions of voluntary and spontaneous forms 
of future thinking within a single study. This differs from previous studies which either 
examined voluntary future thoughts only (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013) or did not 
categorise future thoughts into spontaneous or voluntary subtypes (D’Argembeau, Renaud & 
Van der Linden, 2011). Also, neither of these studies included measures of all four 
abovementioned functions (D’Argembeau, Renaud & Van der Linden, 2011; Rasmussen & 
Berntsen, 2013).  
Using this laboratory paradigm, the present study aimed to address several research 
questions, by measuring directive, self, social, and emotion regulation functions of future 
thinking. 
Research Questions and Predictions 
FUNCTIONS OF SPONTANEOUS FUTURE THOUGHTS 
12 
1: What are the functions of future thoughts and do perceived functions differ 
between voluntary and spontaneous future thoughts (if so, in what way)? 
2: Are perceived functions of future thoughts affected by goal-relatedness? It was 
predicted that selected-goal-related future thoughts would be rated higher for the self-
function than selected-goal-unrelated future thoughts (e.g., D'Argembeau et al., 2012); and 
selected-goal-related future thoughts would be rated higher on the directive function, based 
on evidence from decision-making (O'Donnell, Daniel, & Epstein, 2017). Due to an absence 
of any other functional differences between selected-goal-related and selected-goal-unrelated 
future thinking in the literature, no further predictions were made. 
3. Is there an interaction between mode of elicitation and goal-relatedness in the way 
that people perceive functions of future thought?   
4: How frequently are spontaneous and voluntary future thoughts related to current 
concerns (i.e., relevant to an ongoing goal)? Previous data tentatively suggests that 
proportionally, more spontaneous future thoughts versus voluntary thoughts related to current 
concerns (Cole & Berntsen, 2016). We aimed to ascertain if this result reliably replicates. 
5: It was predicted that we would confirm previous results indicating that selected-
goal-related future thoughts will be elevated in terms of vividness, emotional positivity, and 
specificity, than selected-goal-unrelated future thoughts (in line with Cole & Berntsen, 2016) 
supporting the notion that personal goals have an important role in episodic future thinking 
(D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011).   
6. In line with several previous studies, we predicted that key differences between 
voluntary and spontaneous future thoughts would be evident in our study (Berntsen & 
Jacobsen, 2008; Cole, Staugaard & Berntsen, 2016). Specifically, we predicted that 
spontaneous future thoughts would be more emotional and specific, but less effortfully 
produced, than voluntary future thoughts. 
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2. Method 
 2.1. Participants 
The participants were undergraduate psychology students from York St John 
University, recruited from a research participation scheme. A total number of 46 participants 
completed the experiment each receiving participant credits for taking part. Due to the 
increased statistical power of using a within-groups design, a priori power was determined by 
halving the N size of a recent two-arm independent-group study (Cole & Berntsen, 2016) 
assessing a comparable research question1. Four participants were excluded from the analysis 
due to self-reported mental illness (N=3) and not understanding task instructions (N=1). 
Therefore, frequency data from 42 participants (41 female, 1 male; mean age 19.40 years, SD 
2.52, range 18-31 years) was assessed. Eleven participants were then excluded from analysis 
of functions and phenomenological characteristics due to an absence of at least one selected-
goal-related thought in both the spontaneous and voluntary conditions (N= 10), and an 
absence of at least one selected-goal-unrelated thought in both the spontaneous and voluntary 
conditions (N=1). Therefore, 31 participants were included in the analysis of subjective 
ratings (30 female, 1 male; mean age 19.23 years, SD 2.31, range 18-31 years) due to 
reporting at least one voluntary and spontaneous representation that was selected-goal-related 
and selected-goal-unrelated.  
 
1 The principle underlying our decision to match the  N size to a previous study was based on the fact that this 
study (Cole & Berntsen, 2016) which had effect sizes (ηp2) of .10 - .26 comparing selected-goal-related and non 
selected-goal-related future thoughts. This previous study had large enough effect sizes to find significant 
differences at the .05 and .01 levels. But because Cole & Berntsen (2016) included 32 par ticipants in past and 
future groups, and we had only one future group, an N size of 32 was deemed adequate to find differences in 
a within-groups design.  
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 2.2. Design  
The participants completed both the voluntary and spontaneous tasks, so mode of 
elicitation was within-subjects. The spontaneous condition was always presented before the 
voluntary condition, to avoid contaminating the spontaneous processes if the condition order 
was switched (see also Cole, Staugaard & Berntsen, 2016). Also, participants reported both 
selected-goal-related and selected-goal-unrelated thoughts, so this factor was also within-
subjects. Thus, a 2 (Spontaneous, Voluntary) × 2 (Selected-goal-related, Selected-goal-
unrelated) within-subjects design was employed. In line with the open science agenda (see 
Munafò, Nosek, Bishop, Button, Chambers et al., 2017), the data are accessible in the Open 
Science Framework repository: doi:10.17605/OSF.IO/86A59. 
 2.3. Materials 
The spontaneous and the voluntary tasks were presented on desktop computers with E- 
Prime Professional (Version 2.0). The vigilance task and verbal phrases were identical to 
Cole, Staugaard and Berntsen (2016). The tasks consisted of cue phrases (e.g., gaining 
insight, chewing gum) that were presented centrally on a white background and were 
surrounded by black line arrays. The cue phrases were displayed in the same order for each 
participant. The line arrays were distributed pseudo-randomly around the cue phrases and 
were either horizontal or vertical. The lines differed on how they were arranged on the screen 
(12 variations) and the amount of lines there was on each slide varied (4-8). The cue phrases 
were presented in an Arial font with an 18-font size. The external reliability of the task has 
been verified because research has found consistent results with diary studies (see Schlagman 
& Kvavilashvili, 2008) and convergent validity verified in an unpublished study that found 
frequency of spontaneous future thoughts within the vigilance task predicted frequency of 
those produced in daily life, spanning one week (Cole, Barnes, Jones & Elwell, 2019). 
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2.3.1 The spontaneous future thinking condition  
In the spontaneous condition, participants were presented with a vigilance task which 
required them to identify targets. The targets were vertical lines (N=11) which were pseudo-
randomly distributed throughout the task (every 40-60 trials) and the non-targets were 
horizontal lines (N=589). When the participants identified vertical lines, they were required 
to press the spacebar on the keyboard. Each time participants pressed the spacebar, they 
would receive audio feedback (a bell sound). Cue phrases were presented within the lines 
(N=600). Each slide was presented to participants for 1.5 s. The participants were instructed 
to press the mouse when they experienced a spontaneous future thought. This paused the task 
and the participants then had to complete Part one of the Future Thought Characteristics  
Questionnaire. The participants had to pressed enter on the keyboard to return to the task. 
2.3.2. The voluntary future thinking condition  
The voluntary condition contained 12 cue phrases. Different cue phrases were used 
for the voluntary and spontaneous conditions (cue phrases were extracted from a study of 
spontaneous memory, Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). The amount of cue words 
classified as emotionally positive, negative or neutral were evenly spread within each 
condition (based on ratings by eight independent coders in Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 
2008), and emotional valence of verbal cues did not differ between the conditions. 
Additionally, concreteness and imageability of verbal cues did not differ between conditions 
(see Cole, Staugaard & Berntsen, 2016 for further details). The cue phrases were presented 
centrally among horizontal line arrays which was the same format as the spontaneous 
condition when no target was presented. The participants were instructed to wilfully generate 
a future thought for all the cue phrases they were presented with, one at a time. The slides 
were presented for one minute each and the participants had to press the mouse button when 
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they had a voluntary thought. The participants then had to complete Part one of the Future 
Thought Characteristics Questionnaire for voluntary thoughts. To return to the task the 
participants had to press enter on the keyboard and if they could not think of a future thought 
within one minute, the next phrase appeared automatically. 
Part one of the Future Thought Characteristics Questionnaire was completed 
immediately after each thought had been experienced. This allowed the participants to 
immediately record the retrieved event. Also, it acted as a cue for when the participants 
completed part two. The Current Concerns Questionnaire was presented after all spontaneous 
and voluntary thoughts had been recorded. Part two of the Future Thought Characteristics 
Questionnaire was presented after the current concerns questionnaire had been completed. 
All questionnaires were presented in paper format.  
2.3.3. Current Concerns Questionnaire  
This questionnaire involved participants recording their five most important current 
concerns – that is, their most relevant personal goals. The questionnaire included a 
description of current concerns and provided two examples. Consistent with Cole and 
Berntsen (2016), the description of current concerns referred to them as something you 
would like to achieve or complete (i.e., positive) or something you would like to cope with or 
prevent (i.e., negative). The examples that were provided were, avoiding bankruptcy and 
allocating more time to hobbies. The participants were instructed to choose their own current 
concerns and not be prompted by the examples. This represented a shortened version of the 
instrument used by Johannessen and Berntsen (2010).  
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2.3.4. Future Thought Characteristics Questionnaire  
The participants had to complete a Future Thought Characteristics Questionnaire for 
each of the thoughts they had. A maximum of 24 thoughts could be recorded , 12 spontaneous 
and 12 voluntary. Participants had separate booklets for each condition. Each questionnaire 
was presented on a single A4 page in the booklet. Part one was completed on the left side of 
the A4 page, Part two on the right. Part two was covered with an adhesive note until after the 
current concerns questionnaire was completed.  
Part one was completed immediately after the participants experienced a future 
thought (see Appendix A for Part one of spontaneous condition). In Part one, the participants 
were asked to write a short description of the thought they had and were asked 4 questions.  
The first question addressed the effort that was required to bring the thought to mind (1 to 5; 
1= No effort at all, 5=Extreme effort). The second question asked participants to indicate if 
the thought referred to a particular situation (binary; yes, no). The participants were then 
asked 2 questions concerning temporal distance which are not reported herein as they were 
part of a related but independent project. In the voluntary condition, the participants were 
asked to provide the cue phrase that they used to construct the future thought. The 
spontaneous condition had an additional space in Part one where participants were asked to 
describe what triggered the thought.  
Part two was completed after the Current Concerns Questionnaire and it was covered 
with adhesive notes until it needed completing (see Appendix B for Part two). In Part two the 
participants provided a more detailed description of the event and answered a further 12 
questions. The questions addressed vividness (-2 to +2; -2= not at all vivid, +2= extremely 
vivid) and emotional valence (-2 to +2; -2=very negative, +2=very positive). The following 
8 questions concerned the perceived functions of the future thought and were all rated on 8-
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point scales (0 to 7; 0=do not agree, 7=completely agree) (see Table 1 for function 
questions). The questions were derived or modified from Barsics et al. (2016) and Rasmussen 
and Berntsen (2013). There was one question addressing the self-function of future thoughts. 
To measure the sharing and social identity components of the social function, we utilised two 
items: One concerning social sharing, drawing upon the concept from Bluck et al., 2005; and 
one from Rasmussen and Berntsen (2009) concerning social identity. The directive function 
was addressed with three questions concerning action planning, intention formation (i.e., 
setting oneself a goal) and decision making. Emotional regulation was measured for both a 
present orientated focus (i.e., i.e., reassure oneself), and a future orientated focus (i.e., 
prepare oneself). We note that individual future thoughts can have multiple functions (e.g., a 
future thought of a dinner with friends next weekend may serve a planning and social 
function) and may serve one function more than another (functions may operate 
orthogonally, Barsics et al., 2016). As such, participants completed subjective ratings on 
several scales rather than selecting only one function per future thought (see D’Argembeau et 
al., 2011). After the function questions the participants had the opportunity to describe what 
they thought the function of their future thought was if it was not specified in the questions 
above. The last question asked participants if the event was related to one of the current 
concerns they recorded in the Current Concerns Questionnaire. If the thought was related to 
one of the current concerns, the participant responded by writing what number (1-5) concern 
it related to. With this information, we could aggregate ratings of thoughts related to current 
concerns (‘selected-goal-related future thoughts’) and compare this with the aggregate for 
those not related to any of their most important current concerns (‘selected-goal-unrelated 
future thoughts’), in line with previous research (Cole & Berntsen, 2016). 
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Table 1: Statements Used to Measure Functions of Future Thinking  
 
Function Statement (proposed function in parentheses) 
 
1. (Self) This imagined future event tells me something about my identity. 
2. (Social) I will often share this imagined future event with other people. 
3. (Social) Imagining this future event gives me a sense of belonging with other people.  
4. (Directive) This imagined future event helps me plan my actions in present or future 
situations. 
5. (Directive) This imagined future event contributes to me setting up a new goal. 
6. (Directive) This imagined future event helps me to make a decision. 
7. (Emotional) This imagined future event helps to emotionally reassure me about 
present or future situations. 
8. (Emotional) This imagined future event helps me to prepare myself emotionally for 
present or future situations. 
 
Note: The following items were totalled to form indexes of each of the four functions (2-3; 4-
6; 7-8). 
 2.4. Procedure  
Ethical approval was granted by York St John University’s ethics committee. The 
participants signed up to the experiment through an online participation scheme where they 
had to respond to an online advert. At this point, to prevent participant bias, the actual aims 
of the experiment were withheld. Instead, the participants were told the experiment was 
investigating the effect of a vigilance task on concentration.  
Participants were tested individually in a workstation containing a desktop computer, 
headphones, and questionnaires in paper format. After reading an information sheet the 
participants provided informed consent. An experimenter gave verbal instructions and the 
participants were prompted to ask questions if required. Detailed instructions were provided  
on E-Prime before the experiment started.   
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The instructions on E-Prime stated that the participant’s first task is to complete a 
vigilance task. They were told that during this task they would be required to press the 
spacebar each time they identified a target (vertical lines) and to ignore nontargets (horizontal 
lines). Each time participants pressed the spacebar, they would receive audio feedback (a bell 
sound). Participants were also told that they would see phrases as well as lines, but they were 
to ignore these as these as they were for use in another condition, but actually no such 
condition existed. The participants then completed a 1-minute practice session and were then 
provided with more on-screen instructions. Participants were told that they may find 
themselves thinking about other things due to the task being quite monotonous. They were 
also provided with examples such as, future goals, daydreams and were provided with a 
description of spontaneous future thoughts. They were told that spontaneous future thoughts  
could be in the near or distant future and could be specific or general. They were provided 
with examples and were told that they may have experienced the thought many times before 
or never before. Finally, they were instructed to press the left mouse button as soon as an 
spontaneous future thought comes to mind. They were also reminded that their main aim was 
to press the space bar each time they saw an image with vertical lines.  
When participants experienced a spontaneous thought and they pressed the left mouse 
button, text was presented. This instructed participants to complete Part one of the 
questionnaire in the booklet and then press enter to return to the concentration task. The 
concentration task took 15 minutes to complete without any breaks, but participants took 
longer due to pauses they took in order to record future thoughts. To prevent expectation 
effects, the participants were never informed about the maximum number of thoughts they 
could record. If the participants recorded all 12 thoughts before the last slide, they continued 
the concentration task until it was completed without recording any additional thoughts. 
When the concentration task was completed the participants were instructed to request the 
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experimenter’s assistance. The experimenter then initiated the voluntary condition and 
provided participants with a Voluntary Future Thought Characteristics Questionnaire booklet 
and loaded a voluntary E-Prime experiment on the desktop computer.   
In the voluntary condition participants had to consciously construct an event and there 
was no vigilance task. The participants were provided with instructions informing them that 
they will be presented with some lines and phrases on the screen. They were then told to 
think of a future thought for all the phrases they were presented with, one at a time. The 
phrases were on screen for one minute each and the participants were told to press the left 
mouse button as soon as a future thought comes to mind. The participants were told that if 
they cannot think of a future thought within one minute, the next phrase will appear 
automatically. After the experiment the participants were asked to request the experimenter.  
The participants were then asked to complete the Current Concerns Questionnaire and 
then to remove the adhesive notes covering Part two of the Future Thought Characteristics 
Questionnaires. After the participants removed them, they were instructed to complete Part 
two for every thought, both voluntary and spontaneous. Finally, participants were instructed 
to complete the Beck Anxiety Inventory, but these findings will not be described further as 
they are part of a separate project. The participants were debriefed and were prompted to ask 
questions. The whole experiment took an average of 75 minutes to complete.   
 2.5. Data Analysis 
A future thought was considered selected-goal-related if the participant indicated that 
it was based on one of their five most important current concerns. The data were entered 
under four within-group conditions, selected-goal-related spontaneous thoughts, selected-
goal-unrelated spontaneous thoughts, selected-goal-related voluntary thoughts, and selected-
goal-unrelated voluntary thoughts. For continuous variables, means were calculated for each 
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participant. Specificity was calculated with the proportion of representations that were 
classed as specific. Differences and interactions were calculated using a series of repeated 
measure ANOVAs. All of the participants who were included in the analysis of subjective 
ratings completed both the spontaneous and voluntary tasks and they all recorded at least one 
selected-goal-related thought and one selected-goal-unrelated thought. An alpha level of .05 
was set to determine statistical significance. 
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 3. Results 
 3.1. Vigilance Task 
The vigilance task that was utilised in the spontaneous condition was completed with 
reliably high levels of accuracy with participants identifying on average 10 out of 11 targets 
(M= 93.72, SD= 9.52).  
3.2.   Future Thoughts: Frequency  
 Examination of the completed Future Thought Characteristics Questionnaires showed 
that of all spontaneous future thoughts, 56% were triggered by cue phrases, 8% by thoughts, 
7% by the environment, and 29% had no known trigger. This demonstrates that, like previous 
findings (e.g., Cole et al., 2016; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008), most triggers were cue 
phrases from the concentration task. Future thoughts were checked by the first author to 
ensure it was an appropriate description and that Part 1 and 2 of the autobiographical 
questionnaire was completed. Four of the future thoughts did not fulfil this criterion and were 
excluded (three excluded because the ratings on the autobiographical questionnaire were 
insufficient and the other was excluded because it was not future-oriented). 
After these exclusions there were a total of 566 future thoughts: 129 selected-goal-
related thoughts in the spontaneous condition, 105 selected-goal-related thoughts in the 
voluntary condition, 138 selected-goal-unrelated thoughts in the spontaneous condition, and 
194 selected-goal-unrelated thoughts in the voluntary condition. On average, individuals 
produced 3.07 (SD= 2.56, range= 0-10) selected-goal-related thoughts in the spontaneous 
condition and 2.50 (SD= 2.05, range= 0-8) selected-goal-related thoughts in the voluntary 
condition. The corresponding numbers for selected-goal-unrelated thoughts were 3.29 (SD= 
2.10, range=0-9) in the spontaneous condition and 4.62 (SD= 2.31, range= 1-10) in the 
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voluntary condition (see Table 2). A 2 (Spontaneous; Voluntary) X 2 (Selected-goal-related, 
Selected-goal-unrelated) analysis of variance on the frequency of thoughts demonstrated that 
there were significantly more selected-goal-unrelated future thoughts than selected-goal-
related thoughts (F(1, 41) = 7.42, p < .01, ηp2 =.15), but there was no difference between the 
amount of spontaneous and voluntary thoughts (F(1, 41) = 2.03, p > .05, ηp2=.05). It also 
demonstrated an interaction (F(1, 41)  11.24, p < .005, ηp2=.0.22) that can be decomposed as 
follows; although amounts of selected-goal-related and unrelated future thoughts were similar 
in the spontaneous mode, when in the voluntary mode, there was an increase in selected-goal-
unrelated thoughts and a decrease in selected-goal-related future thoughts. The proportional 
data, which takes propensity to experience and report spontaneous future thoughts into 
account, indicated higher proportions of selected-goal-related future thoughts in the 
spontaneous versus voluntary condition (t(41)=2.16, p <. 001, d = .34).  
For illustration purposes, representative examples of selected-goal-related and 
selected-goal-unrelated thoughts are provided in Appendix C. 
Table 2. Frequencies of Spontaneous and Voluntary Future Thinking (N = 42) 
 Spontaneous  Voluntary 
 M SD  M SD 
Overall 
Frequency 












.43 .28  .34 .23 
 
3.3 Future Thoughts: Functions and Phenomenological Properties 
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 The means, standard deviations, and ANOVA statistics, for all phenomenological 
characteristics and functions, are reported in Table 3. In contrast to the self function, social, 
directive and emotion functions incorporated multiple items, therefore items were averaged to 
form three indexes for each of these conditions (all cronbach’s alphas indicated acceptable 
covariance, .76 - .93, except social current concern index items, a = .43. For this reason, 
social function items were also analysed separately).  
3.3.1 Functions 
 When examining function items, there were no significant difference for 
voluntarily- and spontaneously- elicited thoughts on the self, social or emotional regulation 
functions (see Table 3). There was, however, a significant difference of mode of elicitation 
for the directive function, indicating that spontaneously-elicited thoughts are more strongly 
associated with planning, goal-setting and decision making than voluntarily-retrieved 
thoughts (see Table 3). Additionally, based on findings from autobiographical memory 
research (Waters, Bauer & Fivush, 2014), one might expect specificity to affect the perceived 
functions1. However, when tested in a series of repeated measures ANOVAs (using an alpha 
level of .01 to reduce Type 1 Error), it was found that neither self (F(1,22) = 0.79, p = .39, 
ηp2=.03), directive (F (1,22) = 1.22, p = .28, ηp2=.05), nor emotion regulation functions (F(1, 
22) = 1.04, p = .32, ηp2=.05) were affected by specificity. The only function affected by 
specificity was social (F(1, 22) = 5.55, p = .03, ηp2=.20), whereby more specific future 
thoughts were associated with higher ratings than non-specific future thoughts. 
There were significant effects of goal-relatedness for all of the function questions 
indicating that selected-goal-related thoughts were more tightly connected to directive, self, 
social and emotion functions than selected-goal-unrelated thoughts. This was the case when 
 
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
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each social function item (see Table 1) was analysed separately (both ps < .001). The effect 
sizes (with partial eta squared, see Table 3) were considered large for all functions, and all 
were significant at the .005 level except the self-function).   
In terms of the self function, a significant interaction emerged between mode of 
elicitation and goal-relatedness, such that goal-relatedness increased self function ratings in 
the spontaneous condition to a greater extent than in the voluntary condition (see Table 3). 
Pairwise comparisons of self function ratings contrasting goal-related and non goal-related 
future thoughts indicated that the spontaneous selected-goal-related condition had 
significantly higher ratings than the spontaneous non-selected-goal-related condition (p < 
.005); but no other pairwise differences proved statistically significant. There were no other 
interactions between mode of elicitation and goal-relevance among function measures1. 
3.3.2 Phenomenological Properties 
In line with predictions, voluntary construction required significantly more effort than 
spontaneous elicitation (see Table 3). Second, in line previous findings (e.g., Cole et al., 
2016), spontaneously-elicited thoughts were significantly more likely to be categorized as 
specific than voluntarily-elicited thoughts (see Table 3): Whereas 75% of spontaneously-
elicited thoughts were rated as specific, this was only true for 61% of voluntarily-elicited 
thoughts (see Table 3). Third, there was no significant difference of valence ratings for 
voluntary and spontaneous retrieved thoughts (see Table 3). Fourth, there was no significant 
difference of vividness ratings for voluntary and spontaneous retrieved thoughts (see Table 
3).  
 
1 Considering that one participant was male, it would be useful to ascertain the effect of mode of elicitation and 
goal-salience when this male is excluded; thus making our results generalisable to the female population. When 
this male was excluded, analyses of function ratings with the remaining 30 participants, with the same 
ANOVAs presented in section 3.3.1 showed consistent main effects and interactions as with the male included. 
Thus, we conclude that the addition of this male did not affect our main analyses. 
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In contrast to Cole and Berntsen (2016), and our prediction, there were no significant 
effects of goal-salience on any phenomenological characteristic. Finally, no significant 
interactions between goal-relevance and mode of elicitation were found for any 
phenomenological characteristic (see Table 2). 
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Table 3:  
Descriptive and ANOVA statistics for phenomenological properties and functions 
 Spontaneous  Voluntary  Main effects and interactions 
GR  GUR  GR  GUR  Invol vs. Vol  GR vs. GUR  Interaction 
M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD  F ηp
2
  F ηp
2
  F ηp
2
 
Characteristic                     
Phenomenology                     
Effort 1.85 .67  1.73 .68  2.50 .98  2.45 .87  18.93*** .39  1.05 .03  0.10 .00 
Specificity .75 .28  .75 .31  .65 .34  .57 .33  7.64* .20  1.05 .03  0.60 .02 
Vividness .99 .70  .72 .86  .74 .97  .58 .76  1.67 .05  2.27 .07  0.28 .01 
Valence .79 .96  .60 1.08  .32 1.18  .52 .78  2.66 .08  0.001 .00  1.52 .05 
Function                     
Self 3.37 1.93  2.17 1.61  2.88 2.03  2.62 1.93  0.01 .00  7.86* .21  4.37* .13 
Social 4.14 1.51  2.97 1.65  3.64 1.80  3.11 1.50  0.72 .02  13.99** .32  1.45 .05 
Directive 4.78 1.38  2.37 1.45  3.61 1.69  1.69 1.26  15.69*** .34  85.90*** .74  1.80 .06 
Emotion  3.39 2.12  1.99 1.35  3.07 2.04  1.84 1.37  0.86 .03  26.70***  .47  0.14 .01 
Note: GR=selected-goal-related; GUR= selected-goal-unrelated; ANOVA= analysis of variance; Invol= spontaneous retrieval; Vol= voluntary 
retrieval ; * p <.05, ** p < .005, *** p < .001 




In this laboratory study, the primary aim was to examine the perceived functions of 
spontaneous and voluntary future thinking and whether these differed substantially, thus 
addressing a notable gap in the research on future thinking (Cole & Kvavilashvili 2019b). 
Additionally, we aimed to elucidate whether functions are affected by goal-relatedness, and 
whether spontaneous future thoughts are more frequently goal-related than voluntary future 
thoughts. In line with several recent studies (Barzykowski, Radel, Niedźwieńska, & 
Kvavilashvili, 2019; Cole et al., 2016; Plimpton, Patel & Kvavilashvili, 2015), we aimed to 
further characterise the phenomenological properties of spontaneous future thoughts, using 
voluntary future thoughts as the main comparator (see Cole & Kvavilashvili, 2019a for a 
discussion of this approach). 
In general, findings showed that spontaneous and voluntary future thoughts were judged 
as similarly important on all four functions assessed (self, social, directive and emotional 
regulation). However, the directive function was judged as particularly relevant to spontaneous 
future thoughts. Future thoughts classed by participants as goal-related were endorsed to a 
greater degree across all four functions, and by and large, no interaction was found between 
mode of elicitation and goal-relatedness on functions (with self function as the exception). In 
conflict with our prediction based on a prior study (Cole & Berntsen, 2016), selected-goal-
related future thoughts were not rated substantially higher on phenomenological properties such 
as vividness or emotional valence of the future thought. Nevertheless, we did replicate a prior 
finding (Cole & Berntsen, 2016): a higher proportion of spontaneous future thoughts were 
selected-goal-related compared with voluntary future thoughts. These findings will be 
contextualised within recent research on spontaneous future thinking, and future thinking in 
general. 
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4.1. Differences between spontaneous and voluntary future thoughts 
    It is important to first show that spontaneous future thoughts had the same 
identifying characteristics as shown in previous research, thus adding to the validity of the 
methods employed here. Consistent with previous work (Cole et al., 2016; Berntsen & 
Jacobsen, 2008), and initial predictions, the present study showed that voluntary future 
thinking required significantly more effort than spontaneous future thinking. This is 
consistent with research which found voluntarily elicited thoughts are elicited in a slower, 
more deliberative fashion (Cole, Staugaard & Berntsen, 2016), and are associated with 
greater activity in prefrontal brain regions than spontaneous elicited thoughts (Hall et al., 
2014; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). Low cognitive effort, in addition to the lack of an 
intention to construct a future event, are known to be cardinal properties of spontaneous 
future thought (Cole & Kvavilashvili, 2019b). The present study also replicated previous 
studies indicating that involuntarily elicited thoughts more frequently concern specific events 
than voluntarily elicited thoughts (Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008). These 
findings solidify a small but rapidly-growing literature on spontaneous future thought 
(Bernsten & Jacobsen, 2008; Cole et al., 2016; Finnbogadóttir & Berntsen, 2013; Plimpton, 
Patel & Kvavilashvili, 2015; Warden, Plimpton & Kvavilashvili, 2019), and are consistent 
with a recent theoretical framework positing that voluntary and spontaneous future thoughts 
are associated with specific and dissociable characteristics (see Cole & Kvavilashvili, 2019b). 
4.2.  What are the primary functions of voluntary and spontaneous future thoughts? 
The central question of this study was to identify specific functions of spontaneous 
and voluntary future thoughts and whether they differed. Overall, it was clear that 
participants endorsed all proposed functions – self, directive, social, and emotional regulation 
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- as moderately relevant, as shown by mid-point responses across the measures 
(approximately 3.5, on a 0-7 scale of importance). At least for self, social and emotional 
regulation functions, these ratings did not differ statistically between spontaneous and 
voluntary future thoughts. Directive functions were perceived as more relevant for 
spontaneous versus voluntary future thoughts. Although we allowed participants to describe 
idiosyncratic functions of future thoughts in addition to the scales (Table 1), the very small 
number of these responses (40/450 thoughts, 9% of responses), indicated that the scales 
adopted here captured at least the main functions to which future thoughts are associated.  
To contextualise our results, there have been two previous studies which have 
attempted to measure functions of future thoughts via ratings scales or questionnaires. In 
Rasmussen and Berntsen (2013), participants rated each future thought on social, self and 
directive functions. However, in D’Argembeau et al (2011), participants were required to 
select one function per thought, from a set which included decision-making, planning, 
emotional regulation, non-functional daydreams or other (participant’s qualitative 
description). The current study, however, adopted the approach of Rasmussen and Berntsen 
(2013) on the basis that some future thoughts may serve more than one function. In line with 
our results, Rasmussen & Berntsen (2013) found that self, directive and social functions were 
rated around the mid-point for future thoughts, on average, and additionally, that this was 
higher when positively valenced. Due to the nature of their assessments, D’Argembeau and 
colleagues (2011) used frequency data to show that around 50% of future thoughts served a 
directive function, 18% served a decision-making function and 10% played a role in emotion 
regulation. Although we contextualise our results within these studies’ findings, it should be 
emphasised that this study is not directly comparable to either study, due to different 
assessment methods (D’Argembeau et al., 2011) and numbers of functions examined 
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(D’Argembeau et al., 2011; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013). We now expand on each of the 
four functions of future thinking assessed herein, in relation to mode of elicitation and goal-
relatedness.    
 4.2.1. Social Functions  
First, in contrast to autobiographical memory research (e.g., Bluck et al., 2005, Waters 
et al., 2014), there is a surprising lack of research on the potential social function/s of future 
thinking. There are two notable exceptions: (1) A programme of research showing that 
generating voluntary future thoughts can increase empathic social behaviour (e.g. Gaesser, 
Keeler & Young, 2018) and (2) recent theoretical work highlighting the importance of 
collective future thought, defined as “how individuals think about the future of groups and 
how groups imagine and conceptualize the(ir) future” (p. 377, Szpunar & Szpunar, 2016). In 
autobiographical memory research, memories are shared to demonstrate empathy or intimacy, 
ease communication, or facilitate social bonding (Bluck et al., 2005). The present study adds 
to this pool of evidence, showing that; voluntary and spontaneous future thoughts differ little 
in terms of perceived relevance to social functions, and specific future events are rated as 
more important to the social function compared with general thoughts about the future.  
The latter finding relates to autobiographical memory research showing that specific 
memories have more prominent roles in important everyday functions (Waters et al., 2014). 
We might speculate that specific future thoughts express more about individuals’ plans than 
generic future thoughts, thus are more likely shared with others, and provide more about our 
place in social groups. However, further experimental and naturalistic studies investigating 
the roles that voluntary and spontaneous future thinking play in socio-psychological 
processes, will be necessary to follow-up on these findings. 
 4.2.2. Self Function 
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More widely known is the link between future thinking and the self (Conway, 
Loveday & Cole, 2016; Conway, Justice & D’Argembeau, 2019; Prebble, Addis & Tippett, 
2013). Indeed, the way one perceives their future roles (e.g., ‘I will be a father’, Rathbone, 
Conway & Moulin, 2011), lifetime periods (see Thomsen, 2015 for a review) and the way 
individuals ‘pre-experience’ possible future events with vivid first-person mental imagery 
(D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004) have all been argued to have important links with 
self-identity (Rasmussen and Berntsen, 2013; Conway, Justice & D’Argembeau, 2019; 
Prebble, Addis & Tippett, 2013).  
In the present study, participants rated the self function of future thoughts similarly, 
independently of the mode of elicitation. Nevertheless, selected-goal-related future thoughts 
were rated as more important for self-identity than selected-goal-unrelated future thoughts, in 
line with predictions, indicating that selected-goal-related thoughts are more closely 
associated with an individual’s identity and sense of self. This is consistent with 
D'Argembeau et al. (2010) who found that selected-goal-related thoughts had greater 
personal import (see Johannessen, & Berntsen, 2010, for similar results with past mental time 
travel). Therefore, the present study shows that the self function is moderated by goal-
relatedness, in addition to valence of the future thought (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013). 
Furthermore, there was an interaction between mode of elicitation and goal-
relatedness, whereby goal-relatedness affected self function ratings to a greater extent when 
future thoughts were elicited spontaneously versus voluntarily: Goal relevance had little 
effect on self function ratings of voluntary future thoughts (see Table 3). Although it is 
surprising that an interaction was not also found for other functions, this result may be best 
understood in the context of a recent theoretical account that integrates the revised self 
memory system (Conway, Justice & D’Argembeau, 2019) to explain characteristics and 
functions of spontaneous future thoughts (Cole & Kvavilashvili, 2019b).   
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In sum, the current study extends previous findings by showing that future thinking 
may have a role in shaping our identity (or vice versa) even when they appear in 
consciousness with no attempt at bringing them to mind (see Conway, Justice & 
D’Argembeau, 2019, for related discussions).  
 4.2.3. Emotion Regulation Function 
The emotion regulation function findings highlight a potentially important role for 
future thinking in regulating an individual’s emotions – whether spontaneous or volitional 
(again, no differences were found across mode of elicitation). In support, mean emotional 
valence ratings herein were consistently positive across all future thinking conditions, 
suggesting both voluntary and spontaneous future thoughts may serve the function of 
improving one’s mood (Cole, Staugaard & Berntsen, 2016; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013). 
The present study also found a main effect of goal-relatedness for the emotional regulation 
function indicating that selected-goal-related future thinking is more effective at preparing 
and reassuring individuals about the future. This extends findings from Barsics et al. (2016) 
who found that positive future thinking reassures individuals about the future whereas 
negative future thinking prepares individuals for future events (see also Rasmussen & 
Berntsen, 2013). The findings of the present study highlight an important function for 
selected-goal-related future thought. It suggests that individuals are anticipating what their 
emotions will be in imagined, selected-goal-related future scenarios and are developing 
perceived control over them (see Armitage & Reidy, 2012; Pham & Taylor, 1999). People 
then feel more prepared and reassured about the future which decreases negative emotions 
surrounding any potential goal-related future events. However, this explanation is somewhat 
speculative and future research should attempt to investigate the potential benefits of goal-
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related future thinking for emotional regulation, using measures of attitudes and perceptions 
as well as behaviour (as in Armitage & Reidy, 2008).  
 4.2.4. Directive Function 
Unlike other functions assessed here, it was found that there was a significant 
difference depending on mode of elicitation for the directive function, indicating that 
spontaneously elicited thoughts are associated with the directive function to a greater extent 
than voluntarily elicited thoughts. This is consistent with the idea that the spontaneous mode 
(in general) is less time demanding and so is potentially more useful in situations that call for 
immediate action (see Pillemer, 2003). Spontaneous thought processes are also assumed to 
underlie well-known self-regulation strategies (Gollwitzer, 1999).  
Future thoughts were rated higher on directive functions (i.e., planning, goal-setting, 
and decision making) when they were related to goals: One is likely to generate more plans 
when their future thought is linked to an uncompleted goal (current concern)1. This provides 
additional validity that our coding of selected-goal-related and selected-goal-unrelated 
thought was meaningful and related to the real-life future-oriented plans people experienced 
within this laboratory-based study.  
In sum, the fact that a range of thoughts were elicited herein, and that both voluntary 
and spontaneous thoughts were measured within-participants, provides evidence that future 
 
1 Although somewhat related, as both refer to goals, we believe that current concerns and the directive function 
are conceptually different. Current concerns refer to higher order goals whereas the directive function is centred 
around the pursuit of these goals (so the thoughts/actions required to achieve goals, see Klinger, 1975; Pillemer, 
2003). Also, data from the study indicated that some of the current-concern related thoughts were not rated as 10 
(highly) for the directive function. This indicates that these could be related but separable constructs. In fact, 
16.18% of current concern related thoughts were rated low (< 3) on the planning function, 33.82% for the goal 
setting function, and 32.35% for the decision-making function.  
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thoughts are perceived to have a key role in goal-directed behaviour, and supports prior work 
highlighting the perceived role of future thinking in directing behaviour (D’Argembeau et al., 
2011). Further, this function is accentuated when future thoughts are spontaneous and related 
to current concerns.  
These findings are in line with several recent theoretical developments (see Cole & 
Kvavilashvili, 2019b; Kvavilashvili & Rummel, 2020). Several studies indicate that 
spontaneous future thoughts largely consist of representations of future plans (see Plimpton, 
Patel & Kvavilashvili, 2015). However, more empirical work is needed to understand how 
and when spontaneous future thoughts aid future behaviour in everyday life, using more 
naturalistic approaches. 
4.3. Frequencies of selected-goal-related spontaneous and voluntary future thoughts 
It was predicted that there would be differences in the number of selected-goal-related 
future thoughts in the spontaneous compared to voluntary condition, whereby selected-goal-
related thoughts would be significantly more frequent in the spontaneous condition than the 
voluntary condition. However, it should be noted that although Cole and Berntsen (2016) did 
report a higher proportion of selected-goal-related thoughts in the spontaneous condition, this 
was not present in their analysis of raw frequencies. Nevertheless, we now observe across 
two studies that, proportionally, spontaneous future thoughts are more linked with 
uncompleted goals than are voluntary future thoughts. This lends support to the long-standing 
hypothesis that spontaneous thought is inherently selected-goal-related (Klinger, 2009), and 
points to spontaneous future thinking as an especially important subtype of spontaneous 
thought for guiding cognition and action (see Cole & Kvavilashvili, 2019a and b; Berntsen, 
2009; Kvavilashvili & Rummel, 2020).   
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Finally, we did not find supportive evidence that selected-goal-related future thoughts 
were elevated in terms of vividness, emotional positivity, specificity, than selected-goal-
unrelated future thoughts (see Cole & Berntsen, 2016).  
 4.4. Limitations 
In the present study, mode of elicitation was a within-group factor and one could 
argue that carryover effects from the spontaneous condition to the voluntary condition could 
have confounded the results. For example, participants may have utilised the content of their 
spontaneous future thoughts to construct their voluntary future thoughts. Therefore, a 
between-groups design for the mode of elicitation condition will be an important adaptation 
of this research. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that carry over effects can entirely account for the 
results because the present study found systematic differences between the spontaneous and 
voluntary conditions, replicating previous findings from naturalistic and laboratory studies 
(for a review of these studies, see Cole & Kvavilashvili, 2019a).  
In addition, findings of the present study should be interpreted with the appreciation 
that they represent the participant’s subjective perceptions about the functions and 
characteristics of their future thoughts. These subjective ratings naturally depend upon how 
aware participants are that they relate to their own lives (see Pillemer, 2003, for similar 
arguments concerning memories). Therefore, studies into behavioural measures of future 
thinking (such as future-oriented behavioural paradigms, e.g., Daniel,  
Stanton & Epstein, 2010; visuo-spatial analogues, Spreng, Stevens, Chamberlain, Gilmore & 
Schacter, 2010) and their relationship with subjective measures are required to establish 
convergent validity of these findings.  
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 One must also acknowledge the focus here upon simulations, rather than other types 
of prospective thought (see Szpunar, Spreng & Schacter, 2014). Therefore, our results cannot 
be generalised to other forms of prospection. Indeed, it is possible that the type of prospective 
thought moderates the relationship between prospection and specific functions. For instance, 
intentions and plans may be more tightly related to certain functions (e.g., directive) than 
others (e.g., emotional regulation). 
 Although spontaneous and voluntary future thoughts may have been rated similarly on 
three out of four of the proposed functions, an open – and arguably more important question - 
is how future thoughts are utilised in daily life (see Kvavilashvili & Rummel, 2020). Taking 
the social function as an example, voluntary future thinking may be used to develop joint 
plans with a friend, whereas spontaneous future thoughts may bring these thoughts of plans 
‘online’ between plan formation and the event in an unbidden fashion (see Cole & 
Kvavilashvili, 2019b). In the case of the directive function, where spontaneous future 
thoughts were rated higher than voluntary future thoughts, this could indicate that future 
thoughts are utilised qualitatively differently for planning and future decision-making 
depending on mode of elicitation. Specifically, voluntary future thoughts may be used to 
develop and construct novel plans in daily life, whereas spontaneous future thoughts may act 
as reminders between the time a plan was initiated and when it is enacted (see Kvavilashvili 
& Rummel, 2020; Cole & Kvavilashvili, 2019b for related discussions). The fact that future 
thinking may be utilised in qualitatively different ways in daily life, depending on mode of 
elicitation, and that these differences may not be captured in scales which are unidirectional, 
suggests that future work should focus on real world applications of future thinking. Initial 
applied work has utilised voluntary future thinking to reduce impulsive eating (Daniel, 
Stanton, & Epstein, 2013), but more work is necessary to elucidate how spontaneous future 
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thoughts benefit daily life activities (see Kvavilashvili and Rummel, 2020 for a discussion in 
relation to prospective memory and mind wandering).  
 Finally, in the present study participants could only record five current concerns in the 
Current Concern’s Questionnaire, even though the participants could have potentially 
generated more. Therefore, it is possible that some selected-goal-related future thoughts may 
have been classified as selected-goal-unrelated because their concern was not reflected in the 
most important five they produced in the Current Concerns Questionnaire.  
 4.5.  Conclusions  
Rather than focussing on differences between past and future thought (Rasmussen & 
Berntsen, 2013), the present study adds to an emerging literature on spontaneous thought 
concerning future scenarios by comparing spontaneous and voluntary future thinking (see 
Cole & Kavavilashvili, 2019a) in terms of perceived functions. This study extends previous 
research (D’Argembeau et al., 2011; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013) by showing that future 
thinking may serve at least four functions. Novel results were found concerning the possible 
functions of spontaneous future thinking in guiding self-regulatory behaviour, confirming 
previous theoretical work on spontaneous thought (Klinger, 1975, 2009) and future thinking 
(Schacter, 2012; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). Crucially, across all functions, goal-related 
future thinking could be reliably distinguished from goal-unrelated future thinking. This 
study shows that more work is required examining a wide variety of functions, and how they 
may operate in applied settings, transferring results from the lab into the real-world. 
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Future Thought Characteristics Questionnaire (Part 1) 
 Participant no.: Future Thought no.:  
Please write a short description of the future thought: 
......................................................................................................................................................  
1. Was there anything that triggered the future thought, this could be either in your mind or in 
the environment? If not, please write an "X" for no trigger and proceed to the next 
question. 
......................................................................................................................................................  
2. Please indicate to what extent you actively brought this future thought to mind (please 
circle) 
No effort at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extreme effort 
3. Does the future thought refer to a particular situation in a particular day in your future 
(please circle)? 
Yes / No 
4. How old are you when the imagined future event takes place? (Age estimated in years) 
5. If you indicated your current age in Question number 4, how many days from today is the 









Future Thought Characteristics Questionnaire (Part 2) 




2. How vivid was the future thought (please circle)?                    
Not at all vivid -2 -1 0 1 2 Extremely vivid 
3. What was the emotional valence associated with the future thought (please circle)? 
Very negative -2 -1 0 1 2 Very positive 
The next questions address the functions of imagined future thoughts, if you don’t think an 
imagined future thought has a function rate it as 0. These statements will be rated on a scale of 
0-7.  
1. This imagined future event tells me something about my identity. (Please circle). 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to a very high degree 
2. I will often share this imagined future event with other people. (Please circle). 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to a very high degree 
3. Imagining this future event gives me a sense of belonging with other people. (Please circle). 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to a very high degree 
4. This imagined future event helps me plan my actions in present or future situations. (Please 
circle). 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to a very high degree 
5. This imagined future event contributes to me setting up a new goal. (Please circle). 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to a very high degree 
6. This imagined future event helps me to make a decision. (Please circle). 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to a very high degree 
7. This imagined future event helps to emotionally reassure me about present or future situations. 
(Please circle). 
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to a very high degree 
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8. This imagined future event helps me to prepare myself emotionally for present or future 
situations. (Please circle).  
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to a very high degree 
9. If the function was not specified above please describe what you think the perceived function 
of the imagined future event is.  
......................................................................................................................................................  
......................................................................................................................................................  
Please use your answers to the current concerns questionnaire to answer this question. 
If this is related to one of your current concerns, please indicate which number. 
………. 




Examples of selected-goal-related and selected-goal-unrelated future thoughts 
Example 1: selected-goal-related spontaneous future thought 
“Shopping for Christmas gifts with my stepdad” (Female, 18). 
Relevant current concern: Finishing Christmas shopping.  
Example 2: selected-goal-related voluntary future thought 
“Someone breaking my trust and hurting me” (Female, 18).  
Relevant current concern: To try and talk with and meet new people. 
Example 3: selected-goal-unrelated spontaneous future thought 
“I pictured myself in a wedding dress getting married. Actively thinking about future goals” 
(Female, 20). 
All five current concerns: (1) spend more time with friends, (2) make more time to see 
boyfriend, (3) need to do more reading for university, (4) I am proud of myself for reaching 
36 points target on SONA, (4) I am excited to start my new job in summer.  
Example 4: selected-goal-unrelated voluntary future thought 
“Picking the phone up to my mam calling and asking about my day” (Female, 19). 
All five current concerns: (1) finding a good job, (2) have a family, (3) travel, (4) find a nice 
house, (5) get my degree.  
